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Direct Effect of  International 




The Van Gend en Loos (VGL) decision established the conceptual premises of  a crucial issue 
to shape the relationships between the European Union and international law: the function of  
direct effect as a powerful instrument to guarantee that the rules of  one system are complied 
with in another legal order. However, if  compared with direct effect of  EU legal rules, the issue 
of  the effects of  EU international agreements is made more complicated by the combination of  
the more traditional question of  the self-executing character of  international agreement provi-
sions and the narrow meaning of  direct effect. The former issue, strongly affected by the tech-
nique of  incorporation and the rank of  international law obligations within the incorporating 
legal order, goes to the heart of  the constitutional architecture of  the EU legal order where a 
balance is to be found between the obligation to comply with international law and the integrity 
of  the EU legal order. The latter notion concerns instead the relationship between the private 
person and the legal rule and defines the special character of  the EU which distinguishes it from 
international law. Since such a quality of  EU rules cannot be automatically applied to interna-
tional law rules incorporated in the EU legal order it must be verified case by case. This is the 
reason why, for the present author, the double test approach, first applied by the ECJ in VGL, is 
the right test to determine direct effect of  EU international agreements, but cannot be applied to 
verify the self-executing effect of  international law in the traditional (broader) meaning.
1 Introduction
One of  the most celebrated statements of  the Van Gend en Loos (VGL) decision is that 
there is an ontological difference between ‘classical’ international law as opposed to 
the ‘new’ (EEC) legal order as regards the effects of  legal rules of  these two orders in 
national systems of  law.1
* Associate Professor, Law Department, University of  Pisa. Email: martines@ec.unipi.it.
1 On the correctness of  this approach see for instance Spiermann, ‘The Other Side of  the Story: An Unpopular 
Essay on the Making of  the European Community Legal Order’, 10 EJIL (1999) 763, especially at 786.
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Starting from this proposition, the issue discussed in this article is to what extent 
the international law origin of  EU rules determines their effects in EU and national 
legal orders if  one considers that the EU international agreements, once incor-
porated in the EU legal order, become the law of  the land. In order to answer this 
question, two dimensions of  the relationship between the two legal orders must be 
distinguished.2
First, the EU, in order to define itself  as an autonomous legal order, needs to define 
its relationship with other legal order(s), and in particular, as relevant here, with 
international law. To do this, although not a state, the EU is confronted with the same 
2 The literature on the subject of  the relationship between international law, national and European 
Union law is immense. I  found the following texts particularly useful: D’Aspremont and Dopagne, 
‘Two Constitutionalisms in Europe: Pursuing an Articulation of  the European and International 
Legal Orders’, 68 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2008) 939; Berkey, 
‘The European Court of  Justice and GATT: A  Question Worth Revisiting’, 9 EJIL (1998) 626; 
Bradley, ‘Intent, Presumptions and Non Self-executing Treaties’, 102 AJIL (2008) 540; De Búrca, 
‘The European Court of  Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi’, 51 Harvard Univ 
Law J (2010) 1; Cannizzaro, ‘Il diritto internazionale nell’ordinamento giuridico comunitario: 
il contributo della sentenza Intertanko’, 4 Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea (2008) 645; F.  Casolari, 
L’incorporazione del diritto internazionale nell’ordinamento dell’Unione Europea (2008); De Witte, ‘Direct 
Effect, Primacy and the Nature of  the Legal Order’, in G. De Búrca and P. Craig (eds), The Evolution 
of  European Union Law (2011) 323; Eckes, ‘International Law as Law of  the EU: The Role of  the 
Court of  Justice’, CLEER Working Papers, 2010, available online at http://www.asser.nl/upload/
documents/1212010_60145clee10-6web.pdf  (last accessed 8 January 2014); Edward, ‘Direct 
Effect: Myth, Mess or Mystery’, 2 Diritto dell’Unione Europea (2003) 215; Etienne, ‘Loyalty Towards 
International Law as a Constitutional Principle of  European Union Law?’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 
02/2011, available online at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/11/110301.html (last 
accessed 8 January 2014); Gattinara, ‘La questione pregiudiziale di validità rispetto al diritto inter-
nazionale pattizio secondo la sentenza IATA’, 1 Studi sull’integrazione europea (2006) 343; Eeckhout, 
‘The Growing Influence of  European Union Law’, 34 Fordham J Int L (2011) 1490; Eeckhout, 
External Relations of  the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (2004); M.P. Maduro 
and L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and the Future of  European Union Law: Revisiting the Classics on the 50th 
Anniversary of  the Rome Treaty (2008); Konstadinides, ‘When in Europe: Customary International 
Law and European Union Competence in the Sphere of  External Action’, 13 German Law J (2012) 
1177; Lavranos, ‘Protecting European Law from International Law’, 15 Eur Foreign Affairs Rev 
(2010) 265; M. Mendez, The Legal Effect of  Community Agreements: Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and 
Judicial Avoidance Techniques (2010), at 83 ss.; A. Nollkaemper and O.K. Fauchald (eds), The Practice 
of  International and National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of  International Law (2012); Wessel, 
‘Reconsidering the Relationship between International and European Union Law: Towards a Content-
Based Approach?’, in E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti and R.A. Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of  
the European Union (2011) 7; R.A. Wessel and S. Blockmans (eds), Between Autonomy and Dependence: 
The European Union Legal Order under the Influence of  International Organisations (2013); J. Wouters, 
A. Nollkaemper and E. de Wet (eds), The Europeanisation of  International Law: The Status of  International 
Law in the European Union and Its Member States (2008); Von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, Direct Effect, and 
the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship between International and Domestic Constitutional Law, 6 Int’l 
J Const L (2008) 397; Uerpmann, ‘International Law as an Element of  European Constitutional Law: 
International Supplementary Constitutions’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03, available online at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/03/030901-02.pdf  (last accessed 8 January 
2014); Vasquez, ‘Judicial Enforcement of  Treaties: Self-Execution and Related Doctrines’, 100 ASIL 
Proceedings (2006) 439; Vauchez, ‘The Transnational Politics of  Judicialization. Van Gend en Loos and 
the Making of  European Union Polity’, 16 Eur Law J (2010) 1.
 at New York University on April 7, 2014
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/
Downloaded from 
Direct Effect of  International Agreements of  the European Union 131
order of  issues that have to be dealt with by national systems of  law when they have to 
determine how to guarantee that their international obligations are complied with in 
the internal legal order and whether, and in which case how, to ensure in the domestic 
legal order a way of  escaping these obligations when faced with a pathological event 
(the violation of  obligations by another contracting party). In more general terms, 
any domestic legal order has to establish how to defend its values and core principles 
as an expression of  its identity when incorporating rules which have been established 
in another (the international) legal order.
These problems, which, as mentioned, are shared by all domestic legal orders, are 
made more complicated by the special character of  the EU and the requirement of  
a uniform application of  international legal rules in the legal orders of  its Member 
States. It is from this perspective that one has to consider the issue of  direct effect in the 
broad meaning. This corresponds to the notion of  self-executing effect of  international 
law, a concept which has its origin in the US constitutional law, which concerns the 
structure of  the incorporated international law rule. The rule must be capable of  offer-
ing the judiciary (or the administration) the solution on how to regulate the dispute 
before it.
Secondly, one has to consider that there is another more specific quality of  the rule: 
that is direct effect in a narrow meaning, as defined in its foundation by the ECJ (now 
CJEU) in its Van Gend en Loos decision. This notion refers to the conferment upon pri-
vate persons of  obligations and rights whose protection can be claimed before national 
courts.
The distinction between these two dimensions of  the problem, that is the self-exe-
cuting effect of  international law (strongly connected with the issue of  the mecha-
nism of  incorporation and of  the rank of  international rules in the national system of  
law) and the specific, narrow, notion of  direct effect, may provide a critical interpreta-
tion of  the case law of  the ECJ on the effects of  EU international agreements.
In other words, the VGL decision and its main legacies, in terms of  autonomy of  the 
legal order, the notion of  direct effect, the role of  individuals as subjects of  the legal 
order, the methodology applied by the ECJ, and the function of  direct effect (rule of  law 
or ensuring the observation of  the law), although developed to define the relationship 
between Member States and EU3 legal orders, can provide a key to a better insight into 
the relationship between the EU and the international legal order and a critical under-
standing of  the ECJ’s case law on international treaty law effects.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 will examine the principles govern-
ing the relationship between the EU legal order and international treaty law binding 
the Union and the technique of  incorporation which, it is submitted, strongly deter-
mine the solution of  the issue of  the self-executing effect of  international law provi-
sions. This issue goes to the heart of  the constitutional architecture of  the EU where 
a balance is to be found between openness to international law, legal certainty, and 
compliance with international obligations assumed by the EU, and the integrity of  the 
3 In this article I will use the term EU instead of  EC, although the bulk of  the case law of  the ECJ dates back 
to the pre-Lisbon era.
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constitutional principles which define its identity. Section 3 will deal with the issue 
of  direct effect in its narrow meaning – the conferment on individuals of  subjective 
rights, as defined by the VGL decision – and its application to EU agreements. The 
double test approach methodology, a main legacy of  VGL, shows that whereas direct 
effect in the narrow meaning is the default rule for EU law, it is not so for rules having 
their source in international treaty law binding the EU regardless of  their becoming, 
after incorporation, an integral part of  the EU legal order. This is rather an exceptional 
effect, one that must be verified case by case. This explains why for the present author 
the double test approach in the VGL meaning cannot be applied when the discussion 
concerns the self-executing effect of  international law in the traditional (broader) 
meaning.
2 Principles Governing the Relationship between the 
International and the EU Legal Orders
The question faced by all legal orders – how to ensure that the international law obli-
gations assumed by a state are complied with in the national legal order – finds an 
answer in the definition of  the rank of  those rules in the domestic system of  sources 
of  law (A) and in the technique of  incorporation of  international law rules in the 
national (EU) legal order (B).
In the EU legal system these controversial issues are made even more complicated 
by the special nature of  the EU, which has to ensure the compliance with international 
obligations not only by its own institutions (that is in the EU legal order) but also by 
Member States which are not contracting parties to EU (pure) agreements and which 
have not incorporated these agreements in their legal orders.
A The Supremacy of  International Law over EU Secondary 
Legislation and in Member State Legal Orders
One must first consider the obligation of  the EU to comply with international law. Since 
the origin of  the EEC, the Treaty, and even more clearly the present EU treaties, pro-
vide for the instruments to ensure compliance with the EU’s international legal obliga-
tions. One of  the crucial provisions is Article 216(2) TFEU, which establishes that the 
EU’s international agreements bind EU institutions and its Member States.
As regards the EU institutions, this means that the legislature must adopt, when 
required, legislation to give effect to those provisions that need implementation and 
that later in time EU legislation incompatible with EU agreement provisions would 
not only give rise to the international responsibility of  the EU (a consequence which, 
from the point of  view of  international law, would ensue in any case, regardless of  
the status of  international law in domestic legal systems), but could also result in the 
annulment of  the incompatible EU law.
The obligation of  the EU to comply with international law (as a subject of  interna-
tional law which is the addressee of  the pacta sunt servanda and consuetudo est servanda 
rules) is transmitted into the internal legal orders of  the Member States. The obligation 
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for Member States to observe EU international commitments qua EU law is a further 
guarantee of  compliance. This is ensured, first, by compelling Member States to adopt 
legislation to execute, when required, EU international provisions. Secondly, since EU 
agreements4 become, from their entry into force, ‘an integral part of  the European 
legal order’5 they acquire the rank of  EU law in Member States’ legal orders – without 
any act of  national incorporation. It is only as a consequence of  the status of  the EU as 
a contracting party to an international agreement that the latter enjoys supremacy 
over Member States’ law. The conditions of  the validity of  international law obliga-
tions assumed by the EU in the Member States’ legal orders are actually determined 
only by the EU. Thus, the risk that Member States’ action might contribute to the inter-
national responsibility of  the EU (by omitting executing measures or by adopting legis-
lation incompatible with provisions contained in agreements concluded by the EU) is 
strongly reduced through the application of  the principle of  supremacy regardless of  
the rank that international obligations might assume in Member States’ legal orders. 
Moreover, uniform application of  EU agreement provisions is ensured by the ECJ which 
extends its exclusive (and also binding) jurisdiction to interpret and to determine the 
effects of  the international law provisions contained in the EU agreements.6
B The Technique of  Incorporation of  EU International Agreements 
and Self-executing Rules
Besides the (constitutional) decision as regards the rank of  international law rules in 
the hierarchy of  domestic (EU) sources, the other relevant constitutional choice made 
by any legal order concerns the technique whereby the domestic legal order opens to 
international law. It is maintained here that although the two issues are conceptually 
different, there is a close connection between the methods of  incorporation of  inter-
national law in domestic legal systems (and in the EU’s legal order) and the effects of  
international law rules when they become part of  the domestic (EU) legal order.
 When an ‘automatic incorporation’ method is applied, the will of  the state is 
expressed ‘once and for all’.7 Instead, in the case of  a technique which provides for an 
4 This principle extends to acts adopted by institutions created by agreements as clearly established by the 
ECJ: see, e.g., Case 30/88, Hellenic Republic v. Commission of  the European Communities, [1989] ECR 3711, 
at para. 13.
5 As stated by the ECJ: see Case 181/73, R. & V. Haegeman v. Belgian State, [1974] ECR 449, and for custom-
ary international law Case C–162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I–3688. In 
International Fruit Company the ECJ confirmed its jurisdiction to assess the validity of  EU legislation in the light of  
the alleged violation of  international law: see Joined Cases 21–24/72, International Fruit Company NV and others 
v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, [1972] ECR 1272, at paras 4–6. See Haegeman, supra, at paras 3–6.
6 Art. 3(5) TEU; Art. 216 TFEU. The ECJ is therefore competent to interpret agreement provisions to ensure 
uniformity of  application. In Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG aA, [1982] ECR 
3641, at para. 13, the ECJ qualified the obligation to guarantee compliance to obligations derived from 
agreements as an obligation also assumed vis-à-vis third parties. Later it clarified that the obligation was 
assumed towards the EC in the European legal order: see Case 12/86, Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch 
Gmünd, [1987] ECR 3719, at para. 11.
7 This could happen also in legal orders that are considered dualist: see for instance Art. 10 of  the Italian 
Constitution for customary international law, available at: www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzi-
one/costituzione_inglee.pdf  (last accessed 8 January 2014).
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‘act of  transformation’ or an ‘order of  execution’, an ad hoc statute is adopted for every 
single treaty.8
Apart from the theoretical and ideological approach underpinning these differ-
ent choices, what seems interesting for our discussion is that where the technique of  
automatic incorporation is applied there is no ex ante evaluation of  the content of  
the international law rule,9 whereas in legal orders which incorporate international 
agreements through a formal ad hoc statute the evaluation of  the completeness (effi-
cacy) of  the legal rule takes place when the statute is enacted. In this second case, the 
evaluation is made by the national parliament which resorts to the order of  execu-
tion technique only if  the agreement’s provisions are suitable for application without 
the necessity of  further intervention by the legislature. If  this is not so, it is the same 
parliament which intervenes by adopting integrating norms which are often included 
in the statute providing for the ad hoc incorporation. The ex ante evaluation made by 
the legislature therefore explains why – as a general rule – the so-called self-executing 
character of  the rule, that is the ex post evaluation made by courts on the enforce-
ability of  the international rule, is not particularly contentious in what we can define 
as ‘dualist’ legal orders. The ex ante process of  evaluation could make clear that there 
is a possible incompatibility of  the international law rule with fundamental rights in 
constitutional provisions. This is made more evident in the case of  the incorporation 
or execution of  decisions adopted by institutions created by international agreements.
In legal orders (like the EU) which have opted for the technique of  automatic adap-
tation to international law, the evaluation of  the content of  the incorporated rule, 
whether it is complete or whether it needs to be integrated by further legislation, takes 
place after incorporation. During the process of  incorporation, when a margin for 
manoeuvre is left to the contracting parties when executing international obligations, 
the incompatibility with primary law could in principle be corrected in the implement-
ing (incorporating) legislation.
The task of  courts is thus much more critical in ‘monist’ legal orders, raising the 
thorny issue of  the division of  powers between the judiciary, the legislative, and the 
executive.
A positive finding by the ECJ on this issue (complete character of  the international 
rule) certifies that legislative enforcement – that is the intervention of  the EU’s or Member 
States’ legislatures – is unnecessary, at least as far as the specific norm which is the object 
of  the decision is concerned. On the other hand, a negative finding by the Court (the 
agreement provision is not complete and needs integrating legislation to be enforced) 
highlights a situation of  international breach or, at least, it makes clear that the provision 
can become enforceable only by the passing of  implementing legislation, thus compelling 
the legislative to act in order to comply with the international obligation.
Moreover, the application of  the international law rule by the Court makes it the 
guarantor of  treaty compliance bypassing, at the time of  enforcement, the executive 
8 An alternative method is the reproduction of  the content of  the treaty in a national statute, which is a 
technique applied when the agreement is not complete.
9 It is not by chance that so-called monist legal orders usually contain constitutional provisions clarifying 
the status of  international treaties in the domestic law.
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branch of  the government and dismissing any (possible) alternative enforcement 
mechanism or even a decision by the executive not to enforce the agreement.
We shall consider that, historically, ‘dualist’ techniques requiring the adoption by par-
liament of  an act of  execution of  international treaty law responded to a need to avoid 
the situation where through international agreements the government could impinge 
upon the legislative power prerogatives. We will also consider that the finding on the 
self-executing quality of  the international norms means incorporation into the national 
legal system of  rules which not only may have been adopted with a little control by 
national parliaments (which are traditionally not involved in the negotiating stage of  
international agreements, but which in dualist systems are involved in the process of  
incorporation), but that represent the result of  a trade off  of  the contracting parties’ 
competing interests. International rules barely take into account individual rights and 
public interests the balancing of  which is usually the domain of  national legislations.
It should also be remarked that the relationship between international and EU law is 
reversed when international obligations are assumed by Member States alone. In that 
case international law provisions do not have primacy over EU secondary legislation, 
which could thus override them.10 This is coherent with the autonomous character 
of  the legal order; otherwise a Member State could derogate from EU law obligations 
by concluding an agreement with a third country. Thus the obligation of  the EU to 
respect international law is something to be distinguished, as regards its scope and the 
instruments applied, from the obligation to comply with international law in the EU.
 If  the EU order thus appears rather permeable to international law provisions it has 
assumed, it seems much less permeable, although not watertight, as regards the inter-
national law obligations assumed only by Member States, and is even less permeable to 
international law in regulating the relations between Member States.11 The validity of  
EU law cannot be assessed in the light of  international law not binding the EU, although 
it is incumbent on the ECJ to interpret EU legislation taking into account agreements 
concluded by Member States falling within the field of  application of  EU law. 12
10 According to Art. 351 TFEU, Member States are not required to comply with EU law (and the institu-
tions of  the EU cannot use the EU’s legal tools to oblige them to do this) in a case of  incompatibility with 
commitments undertaken with third countries before they became members of  the EU. Member States 
are, however, required to eliminate any incompatibility with EU law resulting from these agreements. 
A different case is that of  a reference by EU legislation to an international agreement. In this case the 
‘incorporated’ international law rules do not enjoy supremacy status and thus cannot be a ground of  
invalidity of  EU legislation. As for the effect of  such an incorporation the Court clarified that ‘[s]ince the 
Community is not bound by Marpol 73/78, the mere fact that Directive 2005/35 has the objective of  
incorporating certain rules set out in that Convention into Community law is likewise not sufficient for it 
to be incumbent upon the Court to review the directive’s legality in the light of  the Convention’: see Case 
308/06, The Queen, on the application of  International Association of  Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) 
and Others v. Secretary of  State for Transport, [2008] ECR I–4057, at para. 50; Rosas, ‘The Status in EU Law 
of  Agreements Concluded by Member States’, 34 Fordham Int Law J (2011) 1304.
11 The limited possibility of  reverting to international law in the European legal order had been affirmed by 
the Court from its early case law: see Case 7/61, Commission v. Italy, [1961] ECR 361, and Joined Cases 
90/63 and 91/63, Commission of  the European Economic Community v. Grand Duchy of  Luxembourg and 
Kingdom of  Belgium, [1963] ECR 625.
12 Intertanko, supra note 10, at para. 52.
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To sum up, the combination of  the primacy of  EU international agreements over EU 
and national legislation and the technique of  automatic incorporation of  those agree-
ments creates enormous pressure on the use by the ECJ of  interpretative tools which 
can determine if  and to what extent EU and domestic legislation conforms to interna-
tional law obligations. From this perspective direct effect (broader meaning) can play 
a crucial role. If  the ECJ denies direct effect to an international agreement provision 
it would limit the effects of  international law in the EU, but also in the national legal 
orders, reducing the impact of  international obligations not assumed by Member States 
in their legal orders.
The principles that have briefly been mentioned above show that the issue of  direct 
effect of  EU law has a common matrix with the issue of  direct effect of  international 
law as an expression of  analogous constitutional problems: division and balance of  
powers, autonomy of  legal orders, the role of  the courts.
However, the complex system of  interrelation between legal orders, the lack of  a 
formal incorporation of  EU international agreements in Member States’ legal orders, 
the rank of  international law in the EU and in Member States, the different status 
of  international law when it is not binding on the EU may all explain the different 
ration ale and the different outcome of  the case law on direct effect of  EU international 
agreements if  compared with EU law’s direct effect jurisprudence.
3 VGL’s Legacies and the Direct Effect of  EU International 
Agreements
A Individuals as Addressees of  Provisions and the VGL Interpretative 
Approach
In Van Gend en Loos the Court used the expression direct application and not direct effect: 
in the sense that nationals of  member states may on the basis of  this article lay claim 
to rights which the national court must protect.
The notion thus assumes a very specific dimension, that is the recognition that pri-
vate persons may be the direct addressees of  EU legal order provisions which confer 
on them clearly defined rights. This can be considered a narrow meaning of  direct 
effect as compared with a broader one, that is direct effect as referring to the clear, 
unconditional character of  a rule which does not need to be completed by subsequent 
legislation and, as we will discuss later, which can possibly function as a criterion of  
legitimacy of  domestic legislation.
 The status of  private persons as addressees of  EU treaty law is at the very 
centre of  the Van Gend en Loos decision. It is their recognition as subjects of  the 
EU legal order that makes VGL one of  the ECJ’s grands arrêts. The subjects of  the 
EU legal order are those persons who can enforce the rights (in the international 
law context they are, at most, considered beneficiaries of  the situation of  advan-
tage provided for in the legal rule) conferred by the EU rule even against state non-
compliance. The direct applicability of  EU law is the consequence of  the ontological 
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qualities of  the new legal order. It is not exceptional (as in international law), but 
it is an inherent feature of  the legal order that its rules (when clear and precise) 
are addressed to private parties as well as to Member States, a conclusion reached 
by the ECJ through a teleological approach (referring to the spirit and the general 
scheme of  the treaty).
Had the ECJ only performed an analysis of  the complete and clear character of  
the then Article 12 of  the EEC Treaty (second part of  the test), the Van Gend en Loos 
decision would have had a narrow scope and different implications in the legal order 
created by the EEC Treaty. On the other hand, if  the Court had limited its analysis 
to the second part of  the test, the EEC Treaty would have been equated to a clas sical 
international law agreement which can (or cannot) contain self-executing provi-
sions. What really constitutes the turning point in Van Gend en Loos is that it is the 
legal order itself  that stands out for its inherent feature of  being addressed to private 
subjects as a default rule. Moreover, action by private parties before a national juris-
diction is a tool to ensure compliance by states with their legal obligations; this is 
achieved by setting states and private parties’ interests against each other. To reach 
such a conclusion the ECJ had first to proceed to its ‘contextual’ and teleological 
analysis.
Once this has been established in Van Gend en Loos, the first part of  the test 
analysis does not need to be repeated in the subsequent case law on the direct 
effect of  EU Treaty provisions when the ECJ is required to determine the effect of  
other Articles of  the Treaty (see the well-known cases of  Reyners,13 van Duyn,14 
and Defrenne15).
This methodological approach is instead replicated when the ECJ has to determine 
the direct effect of  the EU’s international agreements, regardless of  the fact that they 
have become an ‘integral part’ of  the EU legal order.
This happens because the specific structural feature of  the EU cannot be automat-
ically transposed in the context of  the relationship between the EU legal order and 
international law where the status of  individuals as subjects of  international law is 
(and still remains) the exception. The assumption by the Court, from VGL onwards, is 
that international agreements are not designed to confer rights upon individuals (this 
can be inferred from the distinction made by the ECJ in VGL between the new legal 
order and classical international law). In order to determine such an effect, and thus 
before concluding that a private person can enforce the right conferred by a provision 
contained in an agreement binding the EU before a national tribunal, the ECJ has to 
verify whether the agreement is reproducing those conditions which can be assimi-
lated to those of  the EU legal order,16 and on what basis Member States accepted direct 
effect of  EU law.
13 Case 2/74, Jean Reyners v. Belgium, [1974] ECR 631.
14 Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, [1974] ECR 1337.
15 Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Sabena, [1976] ECR 455.
16 The double test was first applied in International Fruit Company, supra note 5 (where the GATT provisions 
were invoked by traders to contest the validity of  EU measures restricting the importation of  apples. The 
Court’s reference concerned the purpose, the spirit, the general scheme, and the terms of  the general 
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Direct effect thus does not depend on the existence of  a provision explicitly confer-
ring rights to individuals (this would greatly reduce the number of  agreements having 
direct effect, since international agreements very seldom provide for those rights17), but 
depends on the agreement meeting two interpretative criteria: the spirit, structure, and 
nature of  the agreement, first part of  the test, and wording, as second part of  the test.18
Only if  the objective and scope and the global analysis of  the system established 
by the agreement can lead to the conclusion that the agreement ‘intended’ to create 
individual rights in the same manner as the EU legal order creates individual rights, and 
only in this case can the agreement’s provision have direct effect.
It is moreover easier for Member States having accepted direct effect for EU law to 
accept, on the basis of  the same reasoning, direct effect for international agreements 
binding the EU.
This is the background which can provide an insight, and a possible explanation, on 
case law – or at least on some decisions of  the ECJ – on direct effect of  agreements bind-
ing the EU when private persons rely on the agreement as a direct source of  subjective 
agreement). In Case 87/75, Bresciani v. Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato, [1976] ECR 129, at para. 
16, the Court confirmed this approach: it is worth noting that Trabucchi AG, who was one of  the judges 
in Van Gend en Loos, argued that it was necessary ‘at the same time to take the Convention into account in 
order to identify the [Member] State’s Community obligation, which is based on the Treaty and is specifi-
cally defined in the Convention binding the Community’.
17 The exclusion of  direct effect is provided for unilaterally in the practice of  states, as happens in the pre-
amble to the decision of  the conclusion of  the WTO agreement (Council Decision 94/800, OJ 1994 L 
336/1). On this point see the observation of  Gaja, ‘Il preambolo di una decisione del Consiglio preclude al 
“GATT 1994” gli effetti diretti nell’ordinamento comunitario?’, 78 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale (1995) 
407. In the case of  the agreement concluded by the EU with South Korea the exclusion is contained in 
Art. 8 of  the Decision and not in the preamble. See Council Decision 2011/265/EU, OJ 2011 L 127/1. 
In any case one should discuss the question of  the effects of  agreements in the correct context. If  one 
considers the international context, unless the effects of  the agreement’s provisions are fixed in the treaty 
itself, the only obligation which derives from the pacta sunt servanda principle is that contracting parties 
are obliged to give effect to the provisions of  the agreements in the national legal system using what-
ever instruments they may consider appropriate. The pacta sunt servanda obligation does not automati-
cally entail the direct effect status of  rules contained in an agreement. The agreement must be complied 
with, but states are free to decide how to perform this duty. However, the ECJ has excluded direct effect 
as an instrument of  compliance as far as the WTO agreements are concerned. The exclusion of  one of  
such instruments made unilaterally by a contracting party has effect only within the domestic (EU) legal 
system.
18 This very general and commonly made observation should be further discussed. The will of  the contract-
ing parties to an agreement has certainly to be taken into account by national judges when consider-
ing the effect of  a provision of  it. However, this does not rule out an independent interpretation of  the 
provision itself. The will of  the contracting parties could, in other words, satisfy the first part of  the test 
(the will to confer rights on individuals), but it does not automatically satisfy the second one (clarity of  
the rule). In an agreement there could be self-executing provisions but also provisions which, even if  
they were intended to confer rights on individuals, might require further legislative action, and for this 
reason – whatever the will of  the contracting parties – cannot be applied by national tribunals or by the 
administration. But can the will of  the legislature limit the role of  the ECJ in interpreting the agreement? 
The arguments of  Saggio AG in Case C–149/96, Portugal v. Council, [1999] ECR I–8307, at para. 20, and 
Tesauro AG in Case C–53/96, Hermés v. FHT, [1998] ECR I–3606, at para. 24, seem to suggest a negative 
answer. What counts is the character of  the rule which must be sufficiently operational in itself; in other 
words, the second part of  the test needs to be satisfied in any case.
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rights, usually, but not exclusively, to discard a national or EU rule which would other-
wise be applicable. The clear and unconditional character of  the provision (which in 
a domestic legal order would be the crucial criterion on the self-executing character of  
a rule) cannot, by itself, be the only decisive criterion in the analysis. This is illustrated 
by the Court denying that similarly formulated provisions in the Treaty and in the 
international agreement could have the same effect and the same interpretation in 
the EU legal order.
The bulk of  the case law on direct effect – until the last decade or so – concerned 
(with the exception of  the GATT and WTO agreements which are not discussed in 
this article) agreements which create close links (association, pre-accession, coop-
eration, cooperation for development)19 between the EU and its partners. Moreover, 
the provisions of  those agreements were invoked by private parties (traders, immi-
grants, workers), not in the abstract, but in order to claim the enforcement of  a spe-
cific subjective right provided for by the agreements. It is true that the ECJ’s emphasis 
on the first part of  the test seems to have been less accentuated in the more recent 
case law20 (with a reversal of  the order of  the examination by the ECJ: it first analyses 
the content of  the rule and then it applies the aim of  the agreement test usually as 
a non-contradiction type of  analysis), but this could be explained by a consolidated 
theoretical approach regarding these agreements. In the recent Brown Bear case21 
the Court was confronted with the question of  the direct effect of  a provision con-
tained in the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision 
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters of  25 June 1998 (Aarhus 
Convention) promoted by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). This 
is a mixed agreement in EU law. This agreement aims at guaranteeing the rights of  
access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice 
in environmental matters (Article 1). The contracting parties are required to adopt 
all necessary (legislative and regulatory) measures to ensure access to environmental 
information and public participation in a decision on a number of  activities listed in 
the Convention and access to justice. The Convention is very detailed as regards the 
position of  individuals.22
19 See, inter alia, Case 87/75, supra note 16; Case 17/81, Pabst & Richarz KG v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, 
[1982] ECR 1331; Case C–192/89, Sevince v.  Staatssecretaris van Justitie, [1990] ECR I–3461; Case 
C–416/96, Eddline El-Yassini, [1999] ECR I–1209; Case C–37/98, Savas, [2000] ECR I–2927; Case 
C–63/99, Gloszczuk, [2001] ECR I–6369; Case C–265/03, Simutenkov, [2005] ECR I–2579; Case 
C–97/05, Gattoussi, [2006] ECR I–11917.
20 For instance, the ECJ in Case C–162/00, Nordrhein-Westfalen v. Beata Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, [2002] ECR 
I–1049, a case regarding the principle of  non-discrimination contained in the association agreement 
concluded with Poland (before it became a member of  the EU) confirmed the usual formulation as regards 
direct effect of  international agreement (at para. 19) then it started its analysis by examining the content 
of  the provision (at paras 21–22) and only at the end (at para. 26) did the ECJ refer to the aims and struc-
ture (develop cooperation and overcome imbalance) which do not preclude direct effect of  its provisions.
21 See Case C–240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK (Brown Bear), [2011] ECR I–1255.
22 Eckes, ‘Environmental Policy “Outside-In”: How the European Union’s Engagement with International 
Environmental Law Curtails National Autonomy’, 13 German Law J (2012) 1152, at 1155.
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The question examined by the ECJ, on a preliminary reference made by the Supreme 
Court of  the Slovak Republic, concerned the direct effect of  Article 9(3) of  the Aarhus 
Convention which provides for the obligation of  the Parties to ensure that members 
of  the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts 
and omissions by private persons and public authorities which contravene provisions 
of  its national law relating to the environment.23 In this case, an environmental pro-
tection association pretended to enforce this right before national Slovak authorities. 
The Court24 confirmed the application of  the double test, but denied direct effect to 
Article 9(3) of  the Aarhus Convention on the basis of  the wording of  the provision 
(second part of  the test) and without discussing the first threshold. This does not seem 
to contradict the validity (and relevance) of  the double test approach. First, the ECJ’s 
analysis responds to judicial economy, the conditional nature of  the provisions being 
the most contentious issue in this case. Secondly, the ECJ’s reference to the double test 
seems to signal the Court’s readiness to have recourse, if  necessary, to the first part of  
the test.
B The Application of  the Double Test in the Case Law of  the ECJ and 
Its Critique
A different and most controversial question is whether the double test to assess direct 
effect in its narrow Van Gend en Loos definition – creation of  subjective rights for 
individuals – can be applied when international law is invoked as a ground for the 
invalidity of  EU law in a preliminary procedure or in the context of  infringement pro-
ceedings. This is the kind of  situation that was discussed, for instance, in Pêcheurs de 
23 The Aarhus Convention (2161 UNTS 447) provides for access to information (1st pillar); public par-
ticipation (2nd pillar) and access to justice (3rd pillar), that is the right to have recourse to administra-
tive or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions of  private persons and public authorities 
violating the provisions of  environmental law. Two directives (Directive 2003/4/EC, OJ 2003 L 41/26 
and Directive 2003/35/EC, OJ 2003 L 156/17, have been adopted to secure application in Member 
States of  the first and second pillars of  the Aarhus Convention. Regulation 1367/2006, OJ 2006 L 
264/13, secures the Convention’s application to Community institutions and bodies. For the applica-
tion to national public authorities a proposal for a directive was presented but not adopted. The neces-
sity of  a directive providing for a common minimum standard for access to justice was justified by the 
Commission, which underlined the high level of  differentiation of  procedural provisions between the 
Member States and the transboundary dimension of  environmental problems: Commission Proposal 
for a Directive of  the European Parliament and of  the Council on Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters, COM(2003)624 final, 2003/0246(COD). The horizontal private enforcement (in conformity 
with Art. 9(3) of  the Convention), actions both against national authorities and against private parties 
and the legal standing of  environmental organizations and citizens were the most contentious issues 
during the negotiation process.
24 Case C–240/09, supra note 21, at para. 85. The case raises interesting questions as regards the division 
of  powers between the EU and Member States. The Aarhus Convention is a mixed agreement. Since in the 
declaration of  the division of  competence it was stated that Art. 9(3) fell within Member States’ compe-
tences until the adoption by the EU of  legislation covering the implementation of  that provision, one of  
the questions discussed was whether the ECJ had jurisdiction to interpret Art. 9(3). The Court concluded 
that it had competence to interpret Art. 9(3) since the issue concerned related to the field covered ‘in large 
measure’ by EU law. Ibid., para. 42.
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l’Etang de Berre,25 Intertanko,26 IATA,27 Netherlands v. Parliament and Council (Biotech)28, 
Commission v. France (Etang de Berre),29 and ATAA.30
In Pêcheurs de l’Etang de Berre the dispute did not involve a subjective right, but 
rather an interest of  private persons to have the international rules applied. In the 
IATA, Intertanko and ATAA cases claimant parties tried to quash the stricter EU regime 
claiming incompatibility of  the EU legislation with international law. In Biotech 
a Member State required the annulment of  a directive on the ground, inter alia, of  
incompatibility with the Convention on Biological Diversity.
The double test does not seem to fit the control of  validity of  secondary legislation or 
Member State law where private parties are those who might benefit from the interna-
tional (less strict) provisions but who cannot claim a subjective right in a proper sense.
It is argued that in these cases the ECJ should analyse only the content and the scope 
of  the international rule to verify whether it can be applied in the case (Pêcheurs de 
l’Etang de Berre) by the national court (setting aside national incompatible measures), 
or whether it may be applied as a benchmark by which to assess the compatibility of  
national (or the validity of  European) legislation (Biotech, Intertanko, IATA, and ATAA).
The evaluation should, in this case, be based on the assessment of  the clear and precise 
character of  the obligation, which does not require for its implementation the adoption 
of  any subsequent measure.31 The reference to the spirit and the structure of  the agree-
ment should also be taken into account, not in order to assess whether it was intended 
to confer subjective rights on individuals, but as a common process of  interpretation 
which examines the rule in its context and does not satisfy itself  with an analysis limited 
to its wording, as clearly established by international customary rules of  interpretation.
The most interesting example of  this approach (especially if  compared with the 
previous case law, in particular Germany v. Council,32 although that case concerned 
the WTO agreement) is the decision in Netherlands v. Parliament and Council (Biotech), 
where the Court stated, ‘[e]ven if, as the Council maintains, the CBD contains provi-
sions which do not have direct effect, in the sense that they do not create rights which 
individuals can rely on directly before the courts, that fact does not preclude review by 
the courts of  compliance with the obligations incumbent on the Community as a 
party to that agreement’.33 The Court then gave an interpretation of  the relevant 
25 Case C–213/03, Syndicat professionnel coordination des pêcheurs de l’étang de Berre et de la région v. Électricité 
de France (EDF), [2004] ECR I–7557.
26 Case C–308/06, supra note 10.
27 Case C–344/04, The Queen, on the application of  International Air Transport Association and European Low 
Fares Airline Association v. Department for Transport, [2006] ECR I–403.
28 Case C–377/98, Kingdom of  the Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council of  the European Union, 
[2001] ECR I–7079.
29 Case C–239/03, Commission of  the European Communities v. French Republic, [2004] ECR I–9325.
30 Case C–366/10, Air Transport Association of  America and Others v. Secretary of  State for Energy and Climate 
Change, judgment of  3 February 2012 (not yet published in the ECR), available online at http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-366/10 (last accessed 8 January 2014).
31 Ibid., at para. 55.
32 Case C–280/93, Germany v. Council, [1994] ECR I–4973.
33 Supra note 28, emphasis added.
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international law rules (i.e., the Convention on the Biological Diversity) which pro-
vide a benchmark for an assessment of  the compatibility of  the Convention with the 
contested directive.34
In Commission v. France the ECJ examined the provisions of  the international agree-
ments without any reference to their direct effect.
 In Pêcheurs the question discussed was whether the agreement (Protocol of  the 
Barcelona Convention for the environmental protection of  the Mediterranean) had 
direct effect and could be applied by the (French) court to compel EDF to stop the dis-
charges from its hydroelectric power station into the Etang de Berre. The ECJ made 
reference to what seems a clear definition of  direct effect in a broader sense (not sub-
ject to the adoption of  subsequent measure).35 The ECJ36 refers to wording clearly and 
unconditionally defining Member States’ obligations under the agreement, and to the 
purpose and nature of  the agreement in order to support the previous finding.37
In IATA the Court, referring to the Montreal Convention, argued, ‘[a]s to those sub-
missions, Articles 19, 22 and 29 of  the Montreal Convention are among the rules in 
the light of  which the Court reviews the legality of  acts of  the Community institutions 
since, first, neither the nature nor the broad logic of  the Convention precludes this 
and, second, those three articles appear, as regards their content, to be unconditional 
and sufficiently precise’. Then it continued, ‘[i]t is to be noted with regard to the inter-
pretation of  those articles that, in accordance with settled case-law, an international 
treaty must be interpreted by reference to the terms in which it is worded and in the 
light of  its objectives’. The reference in paragraph 39 is not crystal clear, but it should 
be noted that the Court then seems to apply the broader direct effect approach to deter-
mine the content of  the provisions discussed.
 However, in Intertanko the Court discarded the UN Convention on the Law of  the 
Sea as a benchmark by which to assess the validity of  EU Directive 2005/35,38 since 
this Convention did not pass the (strict notion) direct effect test. As noted above, this 
does not seem, with respect, to be a correct test, since the claimants did not invoke 
subjective rights but contested the incompatibility of  international law obligations 
with the above-quoted directive (that is the conditions whereby a rule can be used as 
a parameter for another one).
In ATAA,39 the ECJ, with reference to the nature of  the Kyoto Protocol, referred to 
the Protocol’s degree of  flexibility as to the compliance with the obligations enshrined 
therein and underlined that the Conference of  the Parties had the responsibility of  
approving the necessary measures to determine and address situations of  non-com-
pliance with the Protocol. This reminds us of  a GATT type argument.40 Moreover, the 
34 Ibid., in particular at paras 61 and 66.
35 Case C–213/03, supra note 25, at para. 39.
36 Ibid., at para. 41.
37 Ibid., at para. 43.
38 OJ 2005 L 255/11.
39 See ATAA, supra note 30, at para. 53.
40 Ibid., at paras 73–76.
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Protocol’s relevant provisions, such as Article 2(2), are not considered by the ECJ, as 
regards their content, unconditional and sufficiently precise so as to confer on indi-
viduals the right to rely on them in legal proceedings in order to contest the validity of  
Directive 2008/101.41
As for the ‘Open skies’ agreement, the Court seems to apply the double test with 
reference to certain Open Skies rules designed to apply directly and immediately to 
airlines and thereby to confer upon them rights and freedoms which are capable 
of  being relied upon against the parties to that agreement, and the nature and the 
broad logic of  the agreement do not so preclude, the conclusion can be drawn that 
the Court may assess the validity of  an act of  European Union law, such as Directive 
2008/101, in the light of  the provisions of  the agreement. It follows an examination 
of  the unconditional and sufficiently precise nature of  some of  the Open skies agree-
ment’s provisions.
To sum up, it seems that the double test in cases where the Court is called on to 
determine the validity of  EU (or national) rules adds a condition to the supremacy of  
international law over secondary legislation not provided for in the EU treaties and 
seriously clashing with the EU’s constitutional value of  compliance with international 
law. Thus, the double test must be applied only in order to verify whether the interna-
tional law provision confers a subjective right on private persons in Member States’ 
legal orders; that is it should be verified whether this constitutional feature of  the EU 
law rules is reproduced in the context of  an international agreement binding the EU 
and automatically incorporated in its legal order and in Member States’ law.
In order to assess whether the obligation to comply with international law as a 
constitutional value is satisfied, a test which verifies whether the rule can be used 
as a benchmark, that is its complete and unconditional character, should instead be 
applied. This would also improve the ECJ’s opportunity to achieve, through the inter-
pretation of  EU legislation in the light of  the international agreement rules, the above-
mentioned balance between incorporated international law and EU values.
The application of  the larger notion of  direct effect to verify the compatibility of  
national and EU legislation with international law would overcome the inconsistency 
with EU law, where the incompatibility of  secondary legislation with the treaties or 
a superior law does not depend on the direct effect quality of  the benchmark rule. 
Secondly, the peculiar and inconsistent consequences would be removed: the same 
piece of  EU secondary legislation would be considered invalid because it was incom-
patible with a rule contained in a direct effect agreement, but the same rule could not 
be challenged on the ground of  an identically formulated substantive provision con-
tained in a different agreement which did not satisfy the first part of  the test.
The same problems of  consistency and the illogical consequence of  applying the 
same test to different questions could be demonstrated with reference to international 
customary law.
Although international customary law could be self-executing (clear and precise), 
for its intrinsic characteristics this source of  law does not create subjective rights that 
41 OJ 2009 L 8/3.
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can be invoked before a national court.42 Let us consider the case of  a rule contained 
in an agreement which is the codification of  an international customary rule: could 
a different test be applied to the same rule depending on the source (treaty or cus-
tomary) which provided for it, in order to evaluate the consistency of  EU (or Member 
State) legislation with EU international obligations? The answer seems negative.
There is, of  course, an important difference between EU agreements and custom-
ary international law. The latter binds Member States as subjects of  the international 
legal order and does not raise a question of  incorporation in Member States, whereas, 
as already mentioned, EU agreements are part of  Member States’ legal order auto-
matically after ratification by the EU. The incorporation of  customary international 
law in the EU legal order, its being an ‘integral part of  the EU legal order’ (thus bind-
ing Member States also as an obligation deriving from the EU legal order) however, 
gives customary international law a rank above national (and EU) law regardless of  
the choices made by Member States as regards the opening of  their legal systems to 
international customs and the rank of  customary international law in the national 
legal systems. It also means that the ECJ has the jurisdiction to interpret and – as we 
are here discussing – to appraise the compatibility of  national law with customary 
international law.
4 Concluding Observations
It is an indisputable fact and a common narrative that the recognition of  direct effect 
is one of  the pillars of  the so-called process of  constitutionalization of  the EU defining 
its relationship with Member States’ legal orders. This principle has a comparable con-
stitutional impact in the relationship between the EU and the international legal order. 
However, if  the issue of  direct effect of  EU law has been settled, at least in its founda-
tions, the direct effect of  agreements binding the EU seems to be still in question and 
in need of  systematization. What could contribute to an evaluation of  the case law is a 
terminological and substantial distinction. On the one hand the EU, in order to define 
its relationship with international law, had to determine the methods of  incorporation 
of  international law rules and their rank in its (and Member States’) legal order. These 
choices affect the issue of  the self-executing character of  international rules and cre-
ate an underlying tension between the opening up and the commitment to comply 
with international law and the defence of  EU autonomy.
On the other hand, if  these issues are common to all domestic legal orders and raise 
analogous constitutional problems (division of  powers, role of  the courts), these are 
made more complicated due to the constitutional structure of  the EU.
However, when dealing with the VGL decision and the definition of  direct effect, it 
should be considered that for the ECJ the EEC legal system is to be distinguished from 
international law for a specific quality of  the EU rule, that is of  reaching directly the 
individuals who become subjects of  the rights provided for the EU legal rule.
42 International customary law on human rights is addressed to states, and private parties are only the 
beneficiaries of  these provisions.
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Clearly both questions, the self-executing and direct effect of  an international rule, 
although they must be distinguished, call into question the relationship of  the EU legal 
orders with international law and the crucial role of  the ECJ.
It also results from the case law that the assessments made by the ECJ regarding the 
spirit and the content of  the rule, its completeness, clarity, and unconditional charac-
ter, may be very contentious and leave the ECJ a rather wide margin of  discretion in 
deciding whether, how, and to what extent the EU legal system is permeable to inter-
national law. The factors taken into consideration by the ECJ especially in assessing 
the first part of  the test (reciprocity,43 the creation of  a special relationship, the estab-
lishment of  a dispute settlement mechanism, the possibility of  returning to safeguard 
measures, the flexibility of  the obligations) are the object of  endless debates.
One has to accept that the ECJ has very high political sensitivity and a clear percep-
tion of  what is at stake. Thus, the flexibility of  the double test gives leeway to the ECJ 
in taking, pragmatically, into account a division of  power issue. This means deciding, 
for example, that the provisions require, implicitly or explicitly legislative execution, or 
that the agreement structure leaves the choice of  how to implement its provisions to 
the political branches of  the government. On the other hand, it gives the interpreter 
enough flexibility to respond and to adjust to changing circumstances and situa-
tions,44 thus remedying the rigidity of  the structural EU constitutional principle of  
supremacy of  international law over secondary legislation. The ECJ operates a sort of  
ex post control which, as submitted above, is closely related to the mechanism of  auto-
matic incorporation of  international treaty law into the EU legal system.
Any domestic legal system is in search of  a satisfactory balance between interna-
tional commitments and national values. While the autonomy of  the EU legal order 
vis-à-vis its Member States is functional to validate its authority, once this authority 
has been established (with its identity built around values, but also economic power) 
it has to be asserted and defended against the international legal system.45
It should be underlined that the very existence of  such an issue in the EU legal order 
is a demonstration of  its representation or self-representation as a quasi-domestic 
legal order: in EU law we find reproduced with due caution the dichotomy between 
international law and national sovereignty we find in domestic systems.
There is of  course a risk in approaching international law binding the EU selectively 
which can result in the very denial of  international law, if  pushed too far. The solution 
43 This seems very contentious because, on the one hand, the Court had paid attention to the question of  
balance of  rights and obligations provided for in an agreement; on the other hand it had considered that 
the recognition of  direct effect by other contracting parties was not a reason to deny direct effect of  an 
agreement in the EU legal order. It recognized that the status of  third nationals in the Member States 
could be more favourable than that of  EU citizens in the territory of  the other contracting parties.
44 See for instance the observations made by J. Scott as regards the Demirel case where the author under-
lines that the denial of  direct effect by the Court responded to the changing labour requirements of  
European industry: see J. Scott, The Critical Lawyer’s Handbook, vol. I, available online at www.nclg.org.
uk/book1/2_12.htm#intro (last accessed 8 January 2014).
45 Joined Cases C–402/05 and 415/05, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v. Council of  the European Union and Commission of  the European Communities, [2008] ECR I–6531, at 
para. 285, and Intertanko, supra note 10, at paras 39, 49, 66, and 74.
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should not be found in the choice between alternative values, but rather in coordina-
tion and reciprocal integration.
Of  course, autonomy is not a value per se, but only and to the extent that the defence 
of  autonomy translates into, or is the expression of, the values of  the polity. At the 
same time the effectiveness of  international commitments made by the EU reinforces 
its stance as a reliable actor in the international community, contributing to the asser-
tion of  those values which are an integral part of  its identity.
Moreover, international law must not be perceived only in the negative, that is as 
a limit of  EU action and autonomy. Actually, international law’s integration into the 
EU legal order, the opening up of  the EU legal system to international law through 
automatic incorporation, all means that the EU’s values and aims are to be achieved 
not exclusively within the ‘domestic’ context but in the international legal order as 
well. At the same time international agreements incorporate into the EU legal order 
substantial values which prevail over those expressed in the EU’s legislation.
A decision on direct effect thus becomes one of  the ‘locus’ where the tension between 
the EU’s constitutional value of  complying with international law and the balance of  
incorporated and domestic values takes place.
On the other hand it should also be considered that the EU provides a way of  pro-
tecting its legal order when it establishes that the permeability to its international law 
obligations (technique of  automatic incorporation combined with supremacy over sec-
ondary legislation) finds a limit in the EU treaties and in the Charter of  Human Rights.46 
What could be called the sub-constitutional supremacy47 of  international law means 
that the incompatibility of  an agreement’s provision with primary law might be a limit 
to the direct application of  its provisions. It is clear that this question would arise only in 
the context of  an a posteriori48 control of  compatibility49 of  international agreements with 
EU primary law. In this case the agreement (or the provisions which are incompatible) 
would be considered as not having been incorporated. In other words, Article 216(2) 
of  the TFEU provides for the incorporation only of  international agreements that do 
not impinge upon the constitutional rules of  the EU legal order. A possible remedy in 
the event of  violation of  the EU treaty rules on the legal basis or the violation of  the 
46 This is confirmed by Art. 218(11) TFEU and by the ECJ: see International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 
Opinion 1/78, [1979] ECR 2871; Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the 
countries of  the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of  the European 
Economic Area, Opinion 1/91, [1991] ECR I–6079, at para. 46; Accession by the Community to the 
European Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Opinion 2/94, 
[1996] ECR I–759, at para. 35; see also Case C–211/01, Commission of  the European Communities 
v. Council of  the European Union, [2003] ECR I–8913; Cases C–402/05 and 415/05, supra note 44, at 
paras 308–309.
47 On the relationship between EU and international legal orders see Wessel, ‘Reconsidering the 
Relationship between International and European Union Law: Towards a Content-Based Approach?’, 
supra note 2.
48 It is well known that the evaluation by the ECJ of  the compatibility of  an agreement with the EU Treaties 
on the basis of  the procedure ex Art. 218(11) TFEU prevents the entry into force of  the agreement unless 
the agreement is amended or the Treaties are modified.
49 See, e.g., Lenz AG in Case 165/87, Commission v. Council, [1988] ECR 5545, at para. 34.
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institution competences would be, if  possible,50 the maintenance of  the effects of  the 
agreement while allowing the institutions to remedy the Treaty violation.51
The monist approach (in national legal orders) and the primacy of  international 
law are historically founded on the Kantian idea of  universal peace and the belief  that 
incorporation of  international law in the national legal system would incorporate the 
values of  universalism opposed to those of  a non-democratic and conservative state or 
to modern individualism. This vision might have contributed to the idea that interna-
tional law is always a progress in respect of  national law. It is, however, not always so. 
And, although, as first highlighted in Van Gend en Loos, private parties play a decisive 
role in guaranteeing enforcement and compliance with international law, it should be 
underlined that interests of  private parties could also conflict with the public good.52
As mentioned above, the positive decision of  the ECJ on direct effect removes the 
decision on enforcement mechanisms from the executive or the legislative. This is par-
ticularly contentious in the EU system for the extensive ECJ jurisdiction to interpret 
provisions in mixed agreements as demonstrated in case law53 with a parallel restric-
tion of  national courts’ jurisdiction.
At the same time the enforcement of  treaties by judicial decision is a guarantee that 
the law is applied and respected (rule of  law argument). From this perspective, the 
principle of  consistent interpretation of  national legislation (when, of  course, there 
is national legislation to be interpreted54) as an alternative to enforceability of  agree-
ment provisions plays an interesting function, as demonstrated in the Brown Bear 
case.55 Instead of  replacing the domestic legislation with an international rule, the 
national court (or the administration) is required to apply national legislation accord-
ing to the interpretation suggested by the ECJ.56 This is a more respectful solution of  
national competence, but one which ensures at the same time compliance and the 
uniform application of  the international rule in Member States. However, in the 
absence of  direct effect, the very specific criteria laid down by the ECJ, at least in the 
Brown Bear case, do not leave much space to the national court called upon to apply 
national legislation. This seems even more problematic under the division of  vertical 
competence and division of  powers issues.
50 But see the case of  the agreement concluded by the Commission in the field of  competition with the US 
which was annulled because of  the lack of  competence of  the Commission and required the renegotiation 
of  the agreement: see Case C–327/91, France v. Commission, [1994] ECR I–3641.
51 See on this point Casolari, supra note 2, at 300.
52 See Intertanko, supra note 10; ATAA, supra note 30; and IATA, supra note 27.
53 See Case C–459/03, Commission of  the European Communities v. Ireland, [2006] ECR I–4635; Commission 
v. France, supra note 29; and Brown Bear, supra note 21.
54 E.g., in Case C–91/92, Paola Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl., [1994] ECR I–3325, the national tribunal could not 
have recourse to consistent interpretation doctrine (to decide a dispute between private parties).
55 Ibid.
56 Which is what the Slovak Supreme Court actually did. However, in other cases decided later the Slovak 
Council of  State denied direct effect to Art. 9(3) of  the Aarhus Convention making reference to the ECJ’s 
Brown Bear decision, supra note 21, without mentioning the duty of  consistent interpretation: see in 
particular Buitenring Parkstad Limburg, Council of  State, 29 July 2011, LJN: BR4025, quoted in H.J. 
Jans, ‘European Environmental Cases before Dutch Courts: Observations on Direct Effect and Consistent 
Interpretation’, available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970270 (last accessed 8 January 2014).
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